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Abstract: The decline in the total fertility rate between 1960 and 2005, coupled with an 
increase in life expectancy and the dynamic evolution of past variation in birth and death 
rates, is producing a significant shift in age structure in Asia. The age distribution has 
shifted  from  one  with  a  high  youth-age  population  share  to  one  with  a  high  old-age 
population  share.  We  illustrate  the  role  of  these  separate  forces  in  shaping  the  age 
distribution. We also argue that the economic consequences of population aging depend 
on behavioral responses to the shift in age structure: the female labor force participation 
response  to  the  decline  in  fertility,  child  quality/quantity  trade-off  in  the  face  of  the 
fertility decline, savings adjustments to an increase in life expectancy, and social security 
distortions insofar as the pace of life expectancy improvements is faster than the pace of 
policy adjustments. We estimate the association between old- and youth-age population 
shares  and  economic  growth.  The  results  suggest  that  population  aging  may  not 
significantly impede economic performance in Asia in the long run.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The demographic transition and evolution of past birth and death rates in Asia 
have brought about dramatic shifts in the age structure between 1960 and 2005 (Bloom, 
Canning  and  Fink  2008).  The  combined  forces  of  declining  fertility,  increasing  life 
expectancy, and the transitional dynamics of varying cohort sizes moving through the age 
distribution have led to the rapid aging of societies across much of Asia.
1 From 1960 to 
2005, China experienced the largest absolute increase in life expectancy in the world. 
During the same period, the total fertility rate in the Republic of Korea plummeted from 
5.7 to 1.1 – a change that only a handful of countries have experienced. Japan boasts the 
highest life expectancy in the world at 85.6 for women and 78.7 for men, and it continues 
to rise. 
 
With a decline in fertility, in the short run the youth-age population share declines 
and the working-age share increases. Working-age people contribute to the labor force 
more than youth-age, and if these individuals are gainfully employed (Bloom, Canning, 
Fink and Finlay 2007) then while income per worker can remain the same, income per 
capita increases. In Asia, the decline in the total fertility rate from a regional average of 
6.05 (see Table 1) in 1960, to a regional average of 2.63 has brought with it an increase in 
the working-age share. However, as the total fertility rate falls below the replacement rate 
in many Asian countries the working-age share will decrease in the long run (Bloom, 
Canning, Fink, Finlay 2008) and old-age shares will increase.  
 
As reviewed in Bloom, Canning and Fink (2008), a popular view of the negative 
effects of aging is borne of the growth accounting calculation. If labor supply and savings 
behavior  remain  unchanged,  then  labor  supply,  savings  (and  thus  income)  per  capita 
would decline as old-age shares increase and working-age shares decline. However, the 
dramatic change in family structure creates avenues for behavioral change. With fewer 
children to care for and the support of elderly parents to care for children and contribute 
                                                 
1 Aging in Asia has been particularly dramatic, but it is also taking place in nearly all other regions of the 
world.   3 
to household expenses, individuals who are of working age may be able to work more 
than  they  could  previously.  Savings  patterns  may  change  as  life  expectancy,  income 
potential,  and  expenditure  requirements  change.  Furthermore,  incentives  to  invest  in 
one’s own and one’s children’s education may change as life expectancy increases and 
earning opportunities expand. These behavioral effects may add up to offset the negative 
accounting effects of aging.  
 
There are three key drivers of population aging: fertility decline, increase in life 
expectancy, and age-structure dynamics. When we factor in the behavioral responses to 
the  changes  in  the  various  demographic  variables,  we  find  that  these  different 
demographic forces have different effects on economic growth. The decline in fertility 
causes an increase in the female labor supply (Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay 2007), 
an increase in life expectancy will alter savings incentives (Bloom, Canning and Moore 
2007),  and  a  combination  of  factors  leads  to  increased  investment  in  education  per 
person. The accounting effects of aging, combined with these behavioral responses, mean 
that aging has an ambiguous effect on economic growth.   
 
Changing institutional settings compound the complexity of analyzing the effects 
of aging on economic growth. Reforms in social security and diminished adherence to 
filial piety make for a transformative situation for identifying the responsible agent for 
elder  support  and  care:  adult  children,  the  state,  own  savings  or  labor  supply,  or  a 
company pension.  
 
Will aging have a negative effect on economic growth in Asia? This is the key 
question that we explore in this paper.   In the next section we break down what we 
actually  mean  by  aging  and  illustrate  the  role  of  fertility  decline  and  mortality 
improvements on shifts in age structure. In section three we use regression analysis to 
identify the statistical relationship between age structure and economic growth in Asia, 
and discuss the various behavioral responses to aging in the Asian context. A summary 
follows.  
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2.  Population Aging in Asia 
 
We classify a population with an increasing share of old-age persons as one that is aging. 
This shift in the age structure is brought about by a decline in fertility that reduces the 
number  of  youth,  and  thus  with  no  change  in  the  size  of  the  elderly  population,  the 
elderly  share  increases.  An  increase  in  this  share  can  also  come  about  by  a 
disproportionate increase in the survival of 65+ individuals relative to the improvement in 
survival rates of other age groups. An increasing share of old-age individuals can also 
result from past variation in birth and death rates. These three forces all contribute to the 
trend in most Asian countries of an increasing proportion of 65+ individuals (Figure 6).  
 
  The  reason  for  the  fertility  decline  is  a  contentious  issue  debated  among 
economists  and  demographers.  Bongaarts  (1984;  1994;  1999)  argues  that  the 
improvements  in  contraceptive  access  have  aided  the  decrease  in  fertility  rates.  But 
Pritchett asserts that access to contraception cannot explain why fertility rates have fallen 
by so much, so quickly, and that a shift in preferences explains most of the plummet in 
fertility rates (Pritchett 1994). Deciphering why the total fertility rate has fallen in Asia is 
not  the  focus  of  this  paper;  we  analyze  the  economic  consequences  of  the  observed 
decline in the total fertility rate and the associated increase in old-age population shares.  
 
Improvements in life expectancy in many Asian countries between 1960 and 2005 
in  large  part  reflect  declines  in  child  mortality.  Improvements  in  mortality  can  be 
attributed to public health interventions (for example, improvements in nutrition and the 
provision of water and sanitation) and to medical interventions such as vaccine coverage 
and the use of antibiotics (Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006). But health disparities 
within Asia remain broad: childhood mortality remains high in Laos and Cambodia, for 
example; life expectancy is the highest in the world in Japan, and survival to 60 is close 
to  certain;  and  adult  mortality  is  high  in  West  Asian  countries  relative  to  East  Asia. 
Despite the disparities, life expectancy has increased in all Asian countries (See Table 1) 
between 1960 and 2005.  
   5 
Aging  is  also  a  consequence  of  the  dynamic  evolution  of  past  fertility  and 
mortality rates. Cohorts move through the age groups of the population age distribution. 
The size of the 80-85 age group in 2000 will depend on births in 1915-1920 and the 
mortality rates this cohort experienced as it aged.  When the total fertility rate falls below 
replacement, the birth cohort will be smaller than the parent cohort (excluding migration 
effects).  
 
In this section, we examine the effect of fertility and mortality changes between 
1960 and 2005 on age structure. This exercise illustrates the dominant role of the fertility 
decline in shaping the increase in the proportion of old-age individuals. We illustrate how 
age  structure  will  change  between  2005  and  2050  as  a  consequence  of  fertility  and 
mortality  changes  during  that  period.  We  also  discuss  the  effects  of  the  dynamic 
evolution of 1960-2005 changes in mortality and fertility rates on age structure changes 
between 2005 and 2050. 
   
 
2.1   The effects of mortality and fertility changes on age structure 
 
In Figure 1, we illustrate the effect of fertility and mortality changes on age structure 
between 1960 and 2005. As an example of how to interpret these graphs, consider India 
and  the  0-5  age  group.  The  “fertility  effect”  of  approximately  0.07  indicates  that  if 
fertility rates had remained at 1960 rates then in 2005 the fraction of individuals aged 0-5 
years  old  would  be  seven  percentage  points  higher.  The  “mortality  effect”  of 
approximately –0.001 indicates that if age-specific mortality rates had remained at 1960 
rates then the fraction of individuals in the 0-5 age group would be 0.1 percentage points 
lower  than  it  actually  is  today.  For  each  of  the  represented  Asian  countries  (India, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, China, Japan, Republic of Korea), we see that the fertility changes 
have had a much greater effect on age structure than the mortality changes. In Figure 1, 
we see that the fertility decline in the six example countries has had a similar effect on 
the respective country’s age structure (though the effect in Japan is minimal). If fertility 
rates had remained at 1960 rates, youth population shares would be higher, working-age   6 
shares  would  be  lower,  and  old-age  shares  would  be  lower
2.  Figure  1  illustrates  the 
accounting effect of a decline in fertility leading to an increase in the working-age share 
(or  as  the  graph  represents:  if  the  fertility  rate  had  not  fallen  from  1960  rates,  the 
working-age share would be lower). As to the mortality effect, we see that in four of the 
six  example  countries
3  if  mortality  rates  had  remained  at  1960  rates  then  the  youth 
population share would be lower (as more of the children would have died). With the 
exception  of  Vietnam  and  possibly  China,  working-age  shares  would  be  higher  (as 
improvements in mortality have been concentrated in the childhood age-groups). 
 
The cohorts born in the 1960-2005 period do not reach the 65+ age group until 
2025-2070. Even so, the fertility decline between 1960 and 2005 has an effect on the 65+ 
age group share. In the case of India in 2005, Figure 1 illustrates that if the total fertility 
rate had remained at the 1960 rate then the 65+ age-group population shares would be 
lower. Changes in the total fertility rate in the present do not affect old-age population 
sizes in the present, but they do affect old-age population shares in the present.   
 
For the age structure of a population to change (with zero migration), either (a) 
the fertility rate must change, (b) there must be heterogeneous change in the age-specific 
mortality rates, or (c) there must have been past variation in mortality and fertility rates.  
 
As  shown  in  Figure  1,  the  effect  of  fertility  changes  on  age  structure  in  the 
selected Asian countries has been much more dramatic than mortality changes (even for 
China, where female life expectancy climbed from 37.6 to 73.7). As the improvements in 
life  expectancy  are  a  result  of  improvements  in  mortality  rates  across  all  of  the  age 
groups, the proportion of individuals in each age group does not change much even in the 
face of such steep life expectancy improvements. However, fertility improvements are 
concentrated in the 0-1 age group, which leads to an immediate effect on age structure.  
 
                                                 
2 Old-age shares would be lower in all example countries except for the case of Japan, where the fertility 
decline between 1960 and 2005 has been very small relative to the other example countries. 
3 Japan is different as in 1960 child mortality rates were already very low compared to the other example 
countries.   7 
A change in fertility or a heterogeneous change in mortality has a cohort effect 
that will have an instantaneous effect on age structure. Importantly, this effect will persist 
through the age distribution as cohorts move through the different age groups. These 
population dynamics imply that changes in the 1960-2005 period will continue to affect 
the age structure through the 2005-2050 period (as discussed in Section 2.3). 
 
2.2   The ‘problem’ of aging societies 
 
The  ‘problem’  with  an  aging  society  is  that  the  number  of  old-age  dependents  will 
increase  relative  to  the  number  of  working-age  individuals. Without  deep  analysis,  it 
seems obvious that if people of working age are the workers and people in old age are 
retired, and that if changes in the age structure of the population bring about no change in 
behavior (an increase in savings, for example), then there will be a rising number of old-
age people dependent on the support of working-age individuals.  
 
We show in Figure 2 that the working-age to dependents ratio will eventually 
decline throughout Asia, and comparing Figure 3 and Figure 4 we can see that this will 
be due to the declining ratio of working-age people to old-age dependents. In all Asian 
regions the ratio of working-age people to old-age dependents will decline (Figure 4); 
however, the ratio of working-age to  youth-age dependents will increase in all Asian 
regions except East Asia (Figure 3). In the past, the rise in the working-age share was 
backed by a decrease in youth-age shares. In the future, the decline in the working-age 
share will be backed by an increase in the old-age shares. 
 
The major reason population aging matters is that human productivity and human 
consumption have different time profiles. Children consume more than  they produce. 
This phase now lasts into the late 20s in many countries as they continue in advanced 
education. Between 25 and roughly 65 are the prime working years, in which production 
exceeds consumption. After 65, consumption exceeds labor income.  In most cases the 
young are supported by intra-family transfers. Support for the elderly, who have normal 
consumption and require medical care, is more complex, coming from family support,   8 
personal  savings,  pensions,  and  social  security  transfers.  The  mix  of  these  support 
systems for the elderly differs greatly across countries. The coping ability of transfer 
systems (whether mediated by the family or the state) is limited by the rising proportion 
of the elderly and the consequent high burden on the working-age population.  
 
2.3   Aging in the future 
 
In section 2.1 we showed that much of the aging of a society is driven by the decline in 
fertility. Sharp declines in the fertility rate decrease the number of youth and increase the 
proportion of individuals in old age, even though the population of old people remains 
unchanged. Largely as a consequence of the fertility decline, age structure shifted sharply 
between 1960 and 2005. Changes in the age structure between 2005 and 2050 also appear 
to  be  steep  in  Figure  6.  However,  by  comparing  Figure  5  with  2005  and  2050  age 
structure in Figure 6, we see that changes in age structure between 2005 and 2050 are not 
fully consequent on changes over that period – in particular the age structure changes for 
the 50+ age groups. This is due to the fact that, in addition to the 2005-2050 fertility and 
mortality effects on age structure, shifts in the age structure between 2005 and 2050 will 
be  a  result  of  changes  in  cohort  sizes  stemming  from  steep  changes  in  fertility  and 
mortality  rates  between  1960  and  2005,  as  these  cohorts  move  through  the  age 
distribution.  
 
As the fertility rate is already below replacement in many Asian countries, and the 
mortality improvements are diminishing, changes in age structure as a result of changes 
in fertility and mortality changes over the next 45 years will not be as dramatic as they 
were between 1960 and 2005
4. With fertility and mortality rates stabilizing at low levels, 
the  changes  in  the  age  structure  over  the  next  45  years  will  largely  reflect  dynamic 
evolution of past birth and death rates, and the age structure will move toward stability. 
 
To illustrate the dynamic evolution effects of past birth and death rates on the age 
structure, consider the case of Indonesia in Figure 5. The graph indicates that if fertility 
                                                 
4 India is an exception to this.   9 
and mortality rates remain at 2005 rates, then by 2050 the share of 65-70 year olds would 
be 0.5 percentage points less than what the predicted 2050 65-70 year old age share is, as 
represented in Figure 6. From Figure 6, we see that the share of 65-70 year olds increased 
by  0.035  (3.5  percent);  0.005  of  that  is  explained  by  fertility  and  mortality  changes 
between 2005 and 2050, but the remainder (0.03) is explained by past variation in birth 
and death rates. Thus aging, the increase in the proportion of 65+ individuals, between 
2005 and 2050 is largely consequent on fertility and mortality rate changes prior to 2005.  
 
3  Population Aging and Economic Growth in Asia 
 
Asia’s, and in particular East Asia’s, macroeconomic performance is tracked very closely 
by its demographic transition and resulting changes in age structure. Estimates indicate 
that as much as one-third of its “economic miracle” can be attributed to a demographic 
dividend  (Bloom  and  Williamson  1998;  Bloom,  Canning  and  Malaney  2000;  Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla 2001; Bloom, Craig and Malaney 2001; Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 
2003). The first demographic dividend comes about as an accounting effect of a decline 
in fertility and the resultant rise in the working-age share. When the fertility rate declines, 
the working-age share increases as the number of individuals of working age increases 
relative to the number in the youth age groups. With an increase in the working-age 
share, countries stand to benefit from the proportional increase in the pool of potential 
workers in the economy, and income per capita can increase. By contrast, the absence of 
demographic  change  also  accounts  for  a  large  portion  of  Africa’s  economic  debacle 
(Bloom and Sachs 1998; Bloom, Canning et al. 2003). In addition, the introduction of 
demographic factors has reduced the need for the argument that there was something 
exceptional about East Asia or idiosyncratic to Africa. Most models of economic growth 
have significant region dummies, usually negative for Sub-Saharan Africa and positive 
for East Asia, indicating that the poor performance of Africa and the exceptionally good 
growth  performance  of  East  Asia  cannot  be  explained  within  the  models.  Once  age 
structure  dynamics  are  introduced  into  an  economic  growth  model,  these  regions  are 
much  closer  to  reflecting  widely  understood  drivers  of  economic  growth  (Bloom,   10 
Canning  et  al.  2000)  and  the  statistical  significance  of  the  region  dummy  variables 
disappears.    
 
The  effect  of  changes  in  the  working-age  share  on  economic  growth  is  well 
documented.  We now turn our focus to the effect of old-age share on economic growth. 
This  analysis  is  not  independent  of  the  relationship  between  working-age  share  and 
economic growth. However, when considering the working-age share affecting economic 
growth, the downward forces of youth- and old-age shares is considered symmetric. In 
this  paper,  we  treat  youth-  and  old-age  shares  separately  so  as  not  to  impose  this 
symmetry assumption.   
 
3.1   Channels by which aging affects economic growth 
 
In Part 2 of this paper we illustrated in detail the process of aging in Asia. Sharp declines 
in  fertility  between  1960  and  2005  had  dramatic  effects  on  the  age  structure  of  the 
population.  Moreover,  we  showed  how  the  age  structure  will  continue  to  evolve  as 
population cohorts age between now and 2050. 
 
In this section, we analyze the effect of this shift in age structure on economic 
growth, with a particular focus on Asia. There are many channels by which the shift in 
age structure affects economic growth. In the first instance we illustrate the empirical 
relationship between age-structure shifts and economic growth. Secondly, we discuss the 
behavioral response to a rapid shift in the age distribution: household-level life-cycle 
decisions  may  be  influenced  by  society-level  age  structure  composition.  The  third 
channel we examine is the role of institutional settings in the face of rapid changes in age 
structure. In particular, we look at the role of old-age social security and the incentives 
created by slow-changing laws.  
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3.2   Economic Growth and Age Structure 
 
When analyzing the effects of age structure on economic growth, typically the working-
age share is isolated as the age group of interest. In the coming years, however, concern 
over the potentially depressing effects of old-age dependency on economic growth and 
the differing effects of youth- and old-age dependency has increased interest in directly 
observing the partial effect of these latter variables on economic growth.  
 
  We  take  the  convergence  model  framework  outlined  in  Bloom  and  Canning 
(2008), and dissect population into youth, C , working age, WA, and old, O.  
 
Growth of GDP per worker is characterized by the distance from steady state,  
  ( )
*
0 z g z z λ = −   (1) 
and a vector of variables, X , can affect the steady state level of labor productivity. 
Following the discrete time models in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), there is a log-




  =  
 
, and the steady state level of 
income per worker is summarized as, 
  ( ) 0 z g X z λ β = −   (2) 
To then utilize this theory of convergence in an income per capita model, consider the 
relationship used in Bloom and Canning (2008) that highlights the inclusion of age 
structure in the form of working-age share, 
 
Y Y L WA
N L WA N
=   (3) 
If age structure is represented by working-age share, and the participation rate is constant, 
then, 
  / / / Y N Y L WA N g g g = +   (4) 
Growth of income per worker is explained by the convergence term in (2). As for the 
growth of the working-age share, we wish to observe the separate effects of youth- and   12 
old-age dependency on the growth of income per capita and not just the growth of the 
working-age share. Thus we want to identify, 
  ( ) / / / Y N Y L N C O N g g g − − = +   (5) 
To isolate the growth of the youth- and old-age we can draw on rules of approximation. 









    ≈ −    
   
  (6) 
Then, the working-age is the population less the youth- and old-age populations, so 
growth of the working age can be redefined as, 
  ( )/
0
ln ln N C O N
t




− − − −     = −    
   
  (7) 
The approximation accuracy of  ( ) ln 1 x x − ≈ is increasing in the working-age share, and 
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− −
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+ +     = − +    
   
= − + −
  (8) 
 
Using the following substitutions, 




      = = =      
     
  (9) 
And the fact that taking the logs of both sides of (3) gives, 
  y z w = +   (10) 
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β β β β β β
= − + − + −
= + − + − + −
      = − − − − − − −            
  = + + + + ∆ + ∆  
 
  (11) 
 
Thus the effects of youth- and old-age dependency on growth of income per capita can be 
estimated using the specification outlined in (11).  
 
An implication of equation (5) is that the coefficients on the change in youth- and 
old-age shares are minus one. Any deviation from this coefficient is brought about by 
misspecification. That is, the youth-age and old-age will have heterogeneous effects on 
income per capita as changes in the youth- and old-age shares incite different behavioral 
responses. High youth-age dependency will cause women to exit the workforce to care 
for children. Higher old-age shares, in part brought about by higher life expectancies, 
may reflect lower morbidity thus extending the time which people stay in the workforce.  
Moreover,  the  older  individuals  may  accumulate  capital  (we  control  for  this  in  our 
regression analysis) for a longer period before they draw down on savings.  
 
Included in the vector of explanatory variables describing the steady state level of 
GDP  per  worker,  X,  are  capital  stock,  education,  and  institutional  quality,  and  other 
factors that may affect labor productivity. We also include a global time trend and a 
random error term in this vector. To measure the growth of income per capita we take the 
difference in logs. Thus, the estimated equation is, 
 
  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1
6 6
ln ln t t t t t t t t
t t i t it
y y y edu cap inst c o
c o
β β β β β β
β β δ δ ε
− − − − − − − − = + + + + +
∆ + ∆ + + +
  (12) 
 
Fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable introduce a Nickell (1981) bias. 
Thus, we do not estimate a fixed effects model and instead we control for some potential   14 
country fixed effects with time invariant country specific geographic variables such as 
fraction of land in the tropics, and whether the country is landlocked or not. We also 
control for regional dummies. 
 
 It is reasonable to be concerned about possible endogeneity of the age structure 
variables in the economic growth equation. Periods of high  growth may  increase the 
working-age share through migration effects, or have an effect on fertility and thus the 
youth-age  population  shares  (Bloom  and  Canning  2008).  To  control  for  this  issue  of 
reverse causality, we use five-year lags of the age structure variables (and an alternative 
instrument set using five-year-lag fertility and life expectancy).  
 
Using data from the Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2006) 
for GDP per capita and Penn World Tables 5.6 for capital stock, and demographic data 
from the World Population Prospects (United Nations 2007), we estimate the effect of 
changes in age structure on economic growth. In Table 5 we detail the data sources with 
citations. 
 
In Table 2 we present the descriptive statistics of all of the variables, including the 
instrumental variables, in the regression analysis. We see from these statistics that a range 
of countries are represented in the sample: high to low income, low to high fertility rates, 
low to high infant mortality rates. In Table 3 we detail the country lists of the country 
dummies used. The sample of countries is larger than this, and the country lists only 
detail those of the continent dummies included.  
 
In  Table  4,  we  present  the  regression  results.  In  column  one,  we  present  the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) results for the long run demographic model. In column two 
we introduce the short run effects of youth- and old-age share changes. For these latter 
variables, a change in the youth- or old-age share will have an impact in the short run on 
the annual average five year economic growth rate. The initial level of the youth- and 
old-age shares will affect the long run growth rate. In column three we present the two-
stage-least-squares results for the demographic model. We use the five year lag of the   15 
youth- and old-age change in population share, and the initial year fertility rate and initial 
year infant mortality rate. In columns four and five we introduce the Asian and African 
continent dummies.  
 
We see from the regression results that changes in both youth- and old-age shares 
over a 5 year period have a negative effect on the short-run (5 year) growth rate. This 
effect  is  negative  and  significant  even  in  the  two-stage-least-squares  specifications  in 
columns three and five. Once we control for the continent dummies, however, the results 
indicate that the long run effect of the level of old-age population share is negative but 
not significant. The long run effect of the level of the youth-age population share is, 
however, negative and significant.  
 
Capital stock, trade openness, and institutional quality each have a positive and 
significant effect on the five year growth rate. The significance of these control variables 
is  consistent  with  other  studies:  even  when  controlling  for  these  core  variables  that 
explain cross country differences in economic growth, the level and change in the age 
structure  of  the  population  have  an  effect  on  economic  growth.  Highlighting  the 
importance of demographic change in explaining economic growth is a feature of Bloom, 
Canning and Sevilla (2003) but in this paper, we treat youth-age and old-age population 
shares as heterogeneous. The positive and significant East Asian dummy indicates that on 
average over 1960-2005 period East Asia’s economic growth rate was higher than the 
global average.  
 
Taking the results in column 5 of Table 4, we can interpret the magnitude of the 
coefficients on the demographic variables. A 10 percentage point decrease in the youth-
age share, will increase the economic growth rate by 2.2 percentage points leading to a 
higher steady state income per capita in the long run. From the results, we see that a 
change in the old-age share does not have a significant effect on economic performance 
in the long run. In the short run, if the change in the youth-age share decreases by one 
percent point over a 5 year period, then the average annual economic growth rate will 
increase by 0.7 percentage points. If the change in the old-age share increase by one   16 
percentage point then the average annual economic growth rate in that five year period 
will  decline  by  1.5  percentage  points.  Thus  increasing  old-age  shares  we  observe 
throughout Asia will have a negative effect on economic growth, but in the long run the 
rising share of elderly may not impede economic performance. 
 
   In past studies, the positive influence of an increase in working-age share may, in 
part,  have  been  a  proxy  for  the  decline  in  youth-age  dependents.  The  decline  in  the 
working-age share that is to come in East Asia over the next 45 years is coupled with an 
increase  in  old-age,  and  not  youth-age,  dependency.  The  observed  partial  effect  of 
changes in the growth of the working-age share on economic growth may differ in the 
future, as declines in the working-age share will be coupled with increases in the old-age 
share and not increases in the youth-age share.  From the regression results in Table 4, 
however, we see that for East Asia, the heterogeneity of the effect of youth- and old-age 
shares on economic growth is evident in the long run, but not in the short run. In the short 
run, changes in either youth- and old-age shares have a similar magnitude of effect on 
economic growth. However, the long run effect differs: in the long run low youth-age 
shares will have a positive effect on economic growth, but high old-age shares may have 
an insignificant effect on economic growth.  
 
Old-age dependency is not a given. The compression of morbidity means that a 
significant portion of this population can continue to work, if they so desire. By working 
longer they can save more than in the past for their retirement. But rising income means 
greater demand for leisure and retirement, and this effect may dominate, leading to early 
retirement (Costa 1995). However, if retirement is voluntary and older people have saved 
enough for their old age, they are not dependents. Dependency means financing old-age 
consumption  through  transfers.  If  retirement  is  funded  by  productive  savings  or  own 
labor supply, then the elderly should not be considered 'dependent'.  The case of youth 
dependency is clearer. Born into the world with no financial assets, the young do not 
have  the  savings  or  work-effort  potential  that  the  elderly  have,  and  they  are  clearly 
dependent.  
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Our  results  suggest  that  high  youth-age  shares  are  negatively  associated  with 
economic  performance  in  the  long  run,  and  high  old-age  shares  may  not  have  a 
significant effect the long run steady state level of income per capita. This stands to be 
potentially good news for those Asian countries that are about to experience a decline in 
working-age share coupled with an increase in the old-age shares. The increase in income 
in the past, in part boosted by the increase in the working-age share, was backed by the 
decline in the youth-age shares. In the future, the decline in working-age share will not 
necessarily bring with it a decline in income, as this demographic trend will be backed by 
an increase in old-age population shares and not an increase in youth-age shares.  
 
3.3   Behavioral change: labor supply, savings, and education 
 
Although the model we proposed in the above section implies age structure variables 
have coefficients of –1 in the growth equation, the estimation revealed otherwise. This 
indicates  that  there  is  some  kind  of  measurement  error  in  age  structure  effects.  This 
measurement  error  can  be  explained  by  accounting  and  behavioral  responses  to  age 
structure shifts.  
 
Given  well-established  life-cycle  variations  in  behavior,  it  is  reasonable  to 
suppose that changes in age structure will have effects on aggregate outcomes. Changes 
in age structure bring with them changes in labor supply, savings, and education as the 
number of people engaging in the various life-cycle decisions changes. For example, 
since  labor  supply  tends  to  follow  an  inverted  U-shaped  pattern  with  respect  to  age, 
changes in the age composition of the population are likely to have effects on aggregate 
labor supply. Savings rates also vary with age, with the highest rates occurring for 40- to 
70-year olds, implying that changes in the age structure will affect aggregate savings 
rates. Furthermore, increases in life expectancy mean that more people survive through 
the school ages, and the average number of years of education increases.  
   
However, in addition to these accounting effects there are also behavioral effects 
of aging. Generational crowding (i.e., being born into a large cohort) may have effects on   18 
relative  wages  and  individual  labor  supply  (Easterlin  1980;  Bloom,  Freeman  and 
Korenman 1988; Korenman and Neumark 2000). In addition, falling fertility and youth 
dependency  rates  may  be  linked  to  increased  labor  market  participation,  particularly 
among women, as found in Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay (2007).   
   
Improvements  in  life  expectancy  (which  is  a  proxy  for  better  health)  that  are 
inherent to an aging society can invoke behavioral responses that have a positive effect 
on economic growth. Better health may improve worker productivity (Bloom, Canning 
and  Sevilla  2004).  However,  there  may  also  be  a  demographic  effect  as  a  longer 
prospective lifespan can change life-cycle behavior, leading to a longer working life and 
higher  saving  for  retirement  (Bloom,  Canning  and  Moore  2005;  Bloom,  Canning, 
Mansfield  and  Moore  2007;  Bloom,  Canning  et  al.  2007).  Moreover,  a  higher  life 
expectancy may increase the incentive to invest in education, as the years over which 
returns can be amortized are extended (Finlay 2006). 
 
3.3.1  Labor supply 
 
In Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay (2007), the authors show that the decline in total 
fertility  rate  has  had  a  significant  effect  on  the  increase  in  female  labor  force 
participation. They show that a reduction in the fertility rate of one child is associated 
with an increase in labor force participation of four years. With fewer children, women 
have more opportunities to stay in, or re-enter, the workforce as the time required by 
child  care  declines.  Increased  child  care  services,  and  the  decline  in  the  stigma  of  a 
working mother, have helped to make the option of women staying in (or re-entering) the 
workforce more attractive.  
 
In Bloom, Canning, Fink and Finlay (2007), the Republic of Korea is used as an 
example to illustrate the effect of fertility decline on economic growth. The authors show 
that in Korea demographic effects explain about 14 percent of the increase in income per 
capita. The decline in population growth, the increase in the working-age share, and then   19 
the positive female labor force participation response to the decline in the fertility rate all 
contribute to the rapid rise in income per capita in the Republic of Korea. 
 
The behavioral female labor supply response contributes about 25 percent of the 
14 percent increase in income per capita. This is only one of the behavioral responses that 
can  occur  during  the  demographic  transition.  Further  analysis  of  the  savings  and 
education responses may find compounded effects compared with those found in Bloom, 
Canning, Fink and Finlay (2007) and may thus yield even higher estimates of the income 
effects of demographic change.   
 
3.3.2  Savings 
 
Central to our understanding of the East Asian "miracle" has been Alwyn Young's 
work (1994; 1995) showing that rapid economic growth in the region was mainly due to 
increases  in  factor  inputs––notably  labor,  capital,  and  education––and  not  to 
improvements  in  total  factor  productivity
5.  In  order  to  understand  the  rise  in  income 
levels in East Asia we must therefore understand the driving forces behind the growth in 
these  inputs.  All  of  the  Asian  "Tiger"  economies  enjoyed  a  surge  in  savings  and 
investment during their period of rapid economic growth. We focus here on Taiwan, for 
which there are fairly good data on household savings. The private savings rate in Taiwan 
rose from around 5% in the 1950s to well over 20% in the 1980s and 1990s.  Savings 
rates vary by age, being highest in Taiwan for households with heads in the 50-60 year 
old range. We would therefore expect changing age structure to be a possible explanation 
for this increase in aggregate saving. Studies that examine the link between demographic 
structure  and  national  savings  rates  do  find  a  strong  connection  (Leff  1969;  Fry  and 
Mason 1982; Mason 1987; Mason 1988; Kelley and Schmidt 1995; Kelley and Schmidt 
1996; Higgins and Williamson 1997; Higgins 1998) and suggest that a large part of the 
savings  boom  in  East  Asia  can  be  explained  by  the  changing  age  structure  of  the 
population.  
                                                 
5 This argument is controversial, as discussed in Krugman, P., (1994), The myth of Asia’s economic 
miracle, Foreign Affairs 73, 62-78.   20 
   
However, Deaton and Paxson (2000) show that, based on household saving data 
for Taiwan, changes in age structure account for only a modest increase in the overall 
savings  rate,  perhaps  4  percentage  points.  They  show  that  the  rise  in  the  aggregate 
savings rate has not been mainly due to changes in the age composition of the population 
but, rather, to a secular rise in the savings rates of all age groups.   
   
The question then arises as to why savings rates rose at each age. One possible 
explanation, proposed by Lee, Mason, and Miller (2000) is that increased savings rates 
are due to rising life expectancy and a subsequent need to fund retirement income. Tsai, 
Chu,  and  Chung  (2000)  show  that  the  timing  of  the  rise  in  household  savings  rates 
matches the increases in life expectancy of the population. 
   
With a fixed retirement age we would expect such a savings effect. However, 
Deaton  and  Paxson  (2000)  argue  that  in  a  flexible  economy,  without  mandatory 
retirement, the main effect of a rise in longevity will be on the span of the working life, 
with no obvious prediction for the rate of saving. Bloom, Canning, and Moore (2005) 
formalize this argument to show that under reasonable assumptions the optimal response 
to an improvement in health and a rise in life expectancy is to increase the length of 
working life, though less than proportionately, with no need to raise saving rates at all 
(due to the gains from enjoying compound interest over a longer life span).   
   
The  effect  of  savings  on  investment  and  domestic  production  depends  on  the 
nature of the capital market. With perfect capital mobility, demographic change may have 
an impact on international capital flows (Higgins 1998). In this case, effects on domestic 
interest rates and investment may be minimal (Poterba 2004). However, if capital markets 
are imperfect the demographic transition can lead to a mismatch between the investment 
needs  of  a  large,  young,  working-age  population  and  the  retirement  savings  of  older 
workers (Higgins and Williamson 1997).        21 
 
3.3.3  Education 
 
Demography  can  affect  educational  investments  through  several  mechanisms.  
Perhaps the most important is the quantity-quality tradeoff whereby fertility choices and 
human capital investment decisions are jointly made. This framework points to lower 
fertility rates being both a cause and a consequence of increased educational investments, 
with  both  fertility  and  schooling  determined  by  a  common  set  of  factors  that  affect 
families’ incentives.   
 
Notwithstanding  families’  desired  fertility,  actual  fertility  in  the  absence  of 
contraception  may  be  much  higher.  The  provision  of  family  planning  services  to 
populations  in  which  desired  fertility  is  low  can  both  lower  fertility  outcomes  and 
increase schooling levels. This effect may be particularly pronounced for girls’ schooling 
because with high fertility, girls are frequently kept out of school to help care for their 
younger siblings. Foster and Roy (1997) show how a randomized trial providing family 
planning services in Bangladesh affected both fertility outcomes and children's schooling 
levels. 
 
The quantity-quality tradeoff can also appear to some extent at the national level 
if schooling is publicly funded. Smaller youth cohorts can increase the availability of 
educational funding per child and can lead to an expansion of public education (Kelley 
1996; Lee and Mason 2008). 
 
One reason for an increased incentive to invest in education may be the rise in life 
expectancy. A longer life increases the time over which education investments can be 
recouped.  Kalemli-Ozcan,  Ryder  and  Weil  (2000)  argue  that  the  effect  of  improved 
health and longevity on educational investments has played a large  role in economic 
growth over the last 150 years. This incentive effect, however, is clearly linked to the 
prospective working life rather than total lifespan, suggesting that education levels may 
be linked to planned retirement ages and social security incentives.    22 
 
3.4   Institutional settings: social security 
 
With health improvements and longer life expectancies, the optimal response for 
workers with perfect markets may be to have a longer working life. However, mandatory 
or conventional retirement ages, coupled with the strong financial incentives to retire that 
are  inherent  in  many  social  security  systems,  seem  to  result  in  early  retirement  and 
increased needs for saving for old age (Bloom, Canning et al. 2007). 
 
Generous  state  transfer  systems  not  only  have  financing  problems,  they 
undermine and reduce labor supply of the elderly, increasing effective dependency rates. 
Many social security systems impose a very high effective tax rate on older workers by 
withholding or reducing benefits if they continue to work.  
 
Singapore,  Malaysia,  and  Hong  Kong  (China)  have  fully  funded  universal 
systems. These systems consist of personal accounts so an older worker who continues 
working benefits from a larger sum to retire on. These systems should not discourage 
work at older ages and should be associated with high savings rates. Taiwan, China, 
India, Vietnam, and Indonesia do not have universal systems. In these countries planning 
for retirement has historically been rare. However, they do have systems for the formal 
sector and public sector that can generate large future liabilities.   
   
Specific  social  security  systems  were  designed  for  existing  demographic 
situations  and  may  not  be  appropriate  as  the  proportion  of  elderly  continues  to  rise. 
However,  transforming  these  systems  once  established  is  very  difficult  politically,  as 
entitlements  under  the  systems  are  difficult  to  reduce.  In  countries  without  universal 
systems, population aging will put pressure on governments to provide more coverage, 
given the difficulties experienced by families trying to cope with the issue. The systems 
put in place will have a large impact on how aging affects those economies. 
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4  Summary  
 
In this paper we have illustrated the effects of aging on economic growth in Asia. Aging 
is driven by a decline in fertility, an increase in life expectancy, or the dynamic evolution 
of past variation in birth and death rates. In the first part of the paper we illustrate these 
driving forces of aging. We show that between 1960 and 2005 the shift in age structure of 
the  population  has  been  predominantly  driven  by  the  rapid  decline  in  fertility,  and 
between 2005 and 2050 the dynamic evolution of fertility and mortality changes in the 
1960-2005 period will continue to shape the age distribution. In the second part of the 
paper,  we  estimated  the  statistical  relationship  between  the  youth-age,  and  old-age 
population  shares  and  economic  growth,  both  in  the  long  run  and  in  the  short  run. 
Regression  analysis  indicates  that  in  the  long  run  old-age  shares  may  not  have  a 
significant impact on economic growth. A change in the old-age shares has a negative 
effect on economic growth in the short run, but not in the long run. The level of youth-
age shares (and the change) has a negative effect on long run economic performance. 
This result is good news for Asian countries in the long run as the old-age population 
share increases.  
 
We discuss that population aging has more than a simple accounting effect on 
economic growth and we discuss the various behavioral responses that come with the 
shift in age structure: an increase in female labor force participation as fertility declines, 
an increase in savings, and an increase in education. These factors act together and may 
offset any negative accounting effects of a shift in the age structure, thus in the regression 
analysis  we  observe  an  insignificant  effect  of  rising  old-age  shares  on  economic 
performance in the long run. Overall, the effect of aging on economic growth will be 
ambiguous, as the various behavioral responses may impose economic growth effects of 
differing magnitudes across different countries.    24 
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6  Appendices 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
1960 2005 1960 2005 1960 2005 1960 2005
World (average) 3,821 9,887 5.51 3.03 55.22 68.60 1.32 1.68
World (standard deviation) 3,567 10,221 1.78 1.65 12.71 13.37 0.30 0.43
Asia (average) 2,254 10,529 6.05 2.63 52.89 72.67 1.24 1.80
Asia (standard deviation) 1,720 11,118 1.34 1.23 10.99 7.04 0.17 0.45
Afghanistan      . 581 7.70 . 34.4 . 1.20 1.03
Armenia      . 4,765 4.47 1.37 69.2 76.4 1.30 2.14
Azerbaijan      . 3,671 5.55 2.33 68.2 75.1 1.33 2.09
Bahrain      . 19,561 7.09 2.34 57.5 76.3 1.03 1.91
Bangladesh      . 2,155 6.81 2.98 39.9 64.8 1.16 1.55
Bhutan      . 933 5.90 2.50 38.5 65.2 1.32 1.32
Brunei Darussalam     . 26,239 6.83 2.38 62.9 79.4 1.11 2.07
Cambodia      . 580 6.29 3.89 44.1 60.6 1.21 1.52
China      445 5,333 3.39 1.81 37.6 73.7 1.26 2.42
Cyprus      . 22,383 3.44 1.42 70.6 81.7 1.41 2.13
Georgia      . 5,788 2.95 1.39 67.5 74.9 1.75 1.97
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 3,264 29,644 5.06 0.97 69.8 84.5 1.25 2.91
India      870 2,990 6.57 2.84 43.5 64.3 1.31 1.65
Indonesia      1,099 4,064 5.52 2.27 42.3 69.7 1.32 1.95
Iran (Islamic Republic of)   3,269 6,398 7.00 2.07 48.5 72.8 1.09 2.04
Iraq      . 1,230 7.27 . 51.2 . 1.05 1.28
Israel      6,526 21,242 3.87 2.82 73.2 81.8 1.46 1.61
Japan      4,632 24,660 2.00 1.26 70.1 85.6 1.82 1.81
Jordan      4,187 3,742 7.75 3.29 48.5 73.6 1.09 1.43
Kazakhstan      . 10,169 . 1.75 . 71.9 1.48 2.10
Democratic People's Republic of Korea  . 1,429 4.37 1.96 56.8 66.9 1.52 2.09
Republic of Korea    1,544 18,421 5.67 1.08 55.8 81.1 1.24 2.46
Kuwait      . 26,098 7.27 2.39 61.5 79.7 1.06 2.16
Kyrgyzstan      . . . 2.41 . 72.4 1.37 1.65
Lao People's Democratic Republic   . 1,412 6.15 4.50 41.8 57 1.23 1.27
Lebanon      . 6,085 5.70 2.25 63 74.8 1.16 1.83
China, Macao Special Administrative Region  . 37,956 5.02 0.88 61.9 82.4 1.20 3.14
Malaysia      1,829 12,131 6.81 2.74 55.9 76.1 1.03 1.70
Maldives      . 5,086 7.00 4.00 42.6 67.3 1.19 1.24
Mongolia      . 1,597 6.00 2.33 48.3 68.5 1.18 1.93
Myanmar      . . 6.00 2.23 45.4 64.1 1.25 1.92
Nepal      818 1,441 6.06 3.46 38.4 63.1 1.29 1.40
Oman      . 16,273 7.20 3.44 42.9 76.3 1.08 1.43
Pakistan      803 2,685 6.92 4.12 43.1 65.5 1.20 1.36
Philippines      2,037 3,938 6.96 3.20 55.3 73.2 1.05 1.57
Qatar      . 36,183 6.97 2.89 55 76.6 1.22 1.93
Saudi Arabia     . 16,010 7.22 3.83 45.8 74.6 1.14 1.34
Singapore      4,211 29,419 5.45 1.24 65.7 81.6 1.14 2.54
Sri Lanka     865 4,274 5.35 1.91 56.8 77.4 1.15 2.11
Syrian Arab Republic    829 2,016 7.48 3.24 51 75.7 1.03 1.51
Tajikistan      . 1,942 6.26 3.53 58.9 66.7 1.29 1.36
Thailand      1,086 7,275 6.40 1.89 58.3 74.5 1.11 2.24
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste   . . 6.36 7.47 34.6 57.8 1.23 1.23
Turkey      2,264 5,982 6.28 2.19 52.1 73.8 1.18 1.86
Turkmenistan      . 7,342 6.46 2.60 58.3 67.2 1.31 1.74
United Arab Emirates    . 35,676 6.91 2.43 55 81.6 1.15 1.84
Uzbekistan      . 3,915 . 2.22 62.7 70.7 1.32 1.64
Viet Nam     . 2,561 6.05 1.78 46.3 73.2 1.28 1.87
Yemen      . 1,076 8.36 5.87 34.9 63.2 1.05 1.06
GDP per capita Total Fertility Rate Life Expectancy (female) WA/dependents
 
 
Source:  Penn  World  Tables  6.2  (Heston,  Summers  et  al.  2006);  World  Development 
Indicators 2007 (World Bank 2007)   28 
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Source: Authors' own calculations using World Population Prospects (United Nations 
2007), World Development Indicators (World Bank 2007), and ModMatch in Stata 9.  
 













Working-age to Dependent Population
 
Source: World Population Prospects (United Nations 2007)   30 










Working-age to Youth Population
  
Source: World Population Prospects (United Nations 2007) 
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Working-age to Old Population
  
Source: World Population Prospects (United Nations 2007)   32 
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Figure 6: Age structure 1960, 2005, 2050. The proportion of individuals in the 5-year age 






















































































Source: World Population Prospects (United Nations 2007) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Five year growth rate of income per capita 1.35 3.36 -23.48 20.38
Log real GDP per capita 8.44 1.15 5.14 10.49
Capital stock 0.63 1.96 0.00 22.88
Average years of secondary schooling 5.45 2.83 0.35 12.05
Trade openness 65.23 46.14 3.78 462.93
Freedom House Polity Index 6.14 3.30 0.19 10.00
Life Expectancy 64.06 11.84 31.20 82.10
Tropical Location 0.53 0.48 0.00 1.00
Land Locked 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
Youth-age share 0.35 0.10 0.14 0.51
Old-age share 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.20
Youth-age share change -0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.02
Old-age share change 0.003 0.005 -0.012 0.026
Total Fertility Rate 3.88 1.96 1.08 8.50
Infant Mortality Rate 53 46 3 199
N=616
   35 
Table 3: Country Dummy Lists 
East Asia South Central Asia South East Asia Sub-saharan Africa Latin America
China Bangladesh Indonesia Benin Argentina
Japan India Malaysia Botswana Bolivia
Republic of Korea Iran (Islamic Republic of) Philippines Cameroon Brazil
Nepal Singapore Central African Republic Chile
Pakistan Thailand Democratic Republic of the Congo Colombia
























   36 
Table 4: Regression Results 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ols ols iv ols iv
Log real GDP per capita in the base year -2.184*** -2.077*** -2.153*** -2.037*** -2.111***
(0.35) (0.34) (0.36) (0.39) (0.41)
Capital stock in the base year 0.140*** 0.168*** 0.171*** 0.112** 0.120***
(0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.045) (0.041)
Average years of secondary schooling in the base year -0.0114 -0.0577 -0.0246 -0.0909 -0.0641
(0.080) (0.079) (0.081) (0.078) (0.081)
Trade openness in the base year 0.0137*** 0.0143*** 0.0110*** 0.0149*** 0.0105***
(0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0027)
Freedom House Polity Index in the base year 0.152*** 0.140*** 0.155*** 0.167*** 0.187***
(0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.054)
Life Expectancy in the base year 0.146*** 0.0943*** 0.0748** 0.0606** 0.0497
(0.027) (0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034)
Youth-age share in the base year -19.53*** -21.44*** -24.68*** -18.37*** -21.95***
(3.30) (3.57) (4.41) (3.95) (4.62)
Old-age share in the base year -29.46*** -18.38*** -18.76** -8.902 -10.87
(6.93) (6.77) (7.52) (7.36) (8.19)
Youth-age share change -57.73*** -75.70*** -53.57*** -70.38***
(10.5) (14.8) (10.8) (14.3)
Old-age share change -57.18** -125.2*** -64.44** -149.5***
(23.0) (46.6) (25.0) (48.9)
Tropical location -1.103*** -0.928*** -0.879** -1.104** -1.135**
(0.35) (0.33) (0.35) (0.43) (0.44)
Landlocked 0.389 0.506 0.692* 0.606* 0.754*
(0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.37) (0.39)
Latin America Dummy 0.300 0.259
(0.44) (0.46)
Sub-saharan Africa -0.773 -0.568
(0.56) (0.59)
East Asia Dummy 2.038*** 1.895***
(0.63) (0.63)
South Central Asia Dummy -0.307 -0.389
(0.59) (0.59)
South East Asia Dummy 1.305** 1.554***
(0.58) (0.58)
Constant 20.40*** 22.78*** 21.58*** 19.14*** 21.80***
(3.15) (3.24) (3.80) (4.14) (4.58)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 722 720 649 714 643
R-squared 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.32 0.28
Cragg-Donald F-stat 45.70 40.51
Hansen J p-value 0.411 0.500
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; instruments: 5 year lag of the change in the youth- and old-age shares, 5 year lag of fertility rates and 
infant mortality rates.
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Table 5: Data Sources 
Variable Source
Five year growth rate of income per capita Penn World Tables 6.2, (log(Real GDP per capita)(t) - log(Real GDP per capita)(t-5))/5*100
Log real GDP per capita Penn World Tables 6.2, log(Real GDP per capita) PPP constant 2000 prices
Capital stock Penn World Tables 5.6, interpolated
Average years of secondary schooling Barro and Lee (2000), Average years of schooling for people ages 15 years of older
Trade openness Penn World Tables 6.2, Exports plus Imports divided by GDP per capita, constant prices
Freedom House Polity Index http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1, degree of democracy less degree of autocracy
Life Expectancy World Development Indicators 2007, Life Expectancy at Birth
Tropical Location Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, Miller (2004), Proportion of land in tropical area
Land Locked Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, Miller (2004), Landlocked country dummy
Youth-age share World Development Indicators 2007, Fraction of Population 0-14 years old
Old-age share World Development Indicators 2007, Fraction of Population 65+ years old
Youth-age share change World Development Indicators 2007, Youth age share (t) - Youth age share (t-1)
Old-age share change World Development Indicators 2007, Old age share (t) - Old age share (t-1)
Total Fertility Rate World Development Indicators 2007, Total Fertility Rate
Infant Mortality Rate World Development Indicators 2007, Infant (<1 year) mortality rate per 1000 live births
 
 